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The rate of destruction of tropical forests continues to accelerate at an alarming rate contributing to an 
important fraction of overall greenhouse gas emissions. In recent years, much hope has been vested in 
the emerging REDD+ framework under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
which aims at creating an international incentive system to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation. This paper argues that in the absence of an international consensus on the design of 
results-based payments, “bottom-up” initiatives should take the lead and explore new avenues. It suggests 
that a call for tender for REDD+ credits might both assist in leveraging private investments and spending 
scarce public funds in a cost-efficient manner. The paper discusses the pros and cons of results-based 
approaches, provides an overview of the goals and principles that govern public procurement and discusses 
their relevance for the purchase of REDD+ credits, in particular within the ambit of the European Union.  
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I. Introduction  
 
Tropical forests provide medicines, wood, water and livelihoods to billions of people. Forests 
also play an important role for the climate; they regulate the local and micro-climate, and 
serve as vast reservoirs for sequestering carbon dioxide (CO2).1 Notwithstanding their 
importance, they have rapidly declined in recent decades, in particular due to the expansion of 
agricultural activities, unsustainable logging and forest fires.2 As a result, deforestation and 
forest degradation are responsible for nearly 20% of all global greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions, exceeding thereby the emissions of the global transportation sector.3 
 
In the past, many initiatives have been taken by the international community to address 
deforestation, but success has been elusive so far. Increased demand for wood and for 
agricultural products, along with population pressures, weak governance, and other 
institutional factors continue to constrain the reduction of deforestation and degradation. In 
1 Parrotta et al. (2012).  
2 IPCC (2007).  
3 Available at http://www.un-redd.org/aboutredd/tabid/102614/default.aspx . 
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recent years, much hope has been vested in the emerging REDD+ framework under the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Such a framework would create an 
international incentive system for developing countries to reduce emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation, and promote conservation and sustainable management 
of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks (REDD+). 
 
REDD+ entered the international stage in 2005, when – on the occasion of the 11th conference 
of the parties to the UNFCCC – Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica signalled that they would 
be willing to consider curbing deforestation provided that appropriate financial incentives 
were offered. Many more developing countries joined Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica in 
this initiative, which was welcomed by the global community as one of the first 
internationally publicized efforts by developing countries to make a quantifiable contribution 
to scaled-up mitigation efforts under the UNFCCC. Subsequent UNFCCC decisions have 
reemphasized the importance of REDD+ and formulated initial guidance for the development 
of accounting and measurement systems, safeguards, and financial support.  
 
A major milestone was achieved in Cancun in 2010, where Parties decided that REDD+ 
would most likely be implemented in three phases, starting with national planning and 
“readiness”, followed by demonstration activities, and, finally, leading to the implementation 
of results-based actions that correspond to emission reductions that are measured against 
national baseline or reference (emission) levels.4 For all phases, developed countries promised 
to provide significant financial support.  
 
In Doha at COP-17, countries agreed that “appropriate market-based approaches” could be 
considered “to support the results-based actions by developing country Parties”. It suggests 
that such finance “may come from a variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and 
multilateral, including alternative sources” and that “appropriate market-based approaches [. . 
.] to support results-based actions by developing countries” could be developed.5 Parties 
further adopted guidance on reference emission levels and/or reference levels to establish 
benchmarks that would serve to account for emission reductions from REDD+ activities.6 
While it remains unclear if and how these reference levels might be tied to ‘results-based’ 
payments in the future, consensus has emerged that international finance would be linked to 
concrete results in achieving climate benefits through REDD+.7 
 
Strategies to mobilize finance for REDD+ can be divided into those applicable in the short 
term and those generating sustained investment in REDD+ over the long term. They can also 
be divided into private and public sector driven opportunities. In the long term a connection 
between investments in sustainable land use and REDD+ is one of the most promising options 
for mobilizing sustained funding for REDD+.  
 
4 Sterk (2012: 20). 
5 UNFCCC (2011). Decision 2/CP.17. Par. 66. U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1.  
6 UNFCCC (2011). Decision 12/CP.17 U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.2 (15 Mar 2012). 
7 Streck and Costenbader (2012: 7). 
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In the short- and medium-term, REDD+ is likely to be supported mainly by public funds. 
While the private sector has made great strides in fostering and refining results-based 
approaches within the ambit of the voluntary carbon market, public money is essentially spent 
on REDD-“readiness” activities. While it is clear that results-based payments may not replace 
payments for REDD+ readiness (phase 1 and 2), a “wait and see” approach to the challenges 
they pose is probably not an appropriate way to make progress. Failing a more pro-active 
stance, there is a substantial risk that the great potential of forests for climate mitigation will 
remain underfunded. 8 
 
A pragmatic and yet possibly effective option that would not pre-empt a decision at the 
international level on the adoption of market-based approaches9 would be the setup of public 
purchase programmes for carbon credits resulting from REDD+ projects by national or 
subnational public agencies in developed countries. This would help in identifying early, cost-
efficient and accessible GHG emission reduction strategies while pushing the development of 
implementation and monitoring capacities on the ground. The greater the mandate and 
flexibility of such programmes (e.g. by providing advance payments) the more they would 
also encourage private initiatives to engage in REDD+ activities.  
 
With the goal of facilitating early investments in REDD+ that would provide a pathway to 
scaled-up REDD+ finance in the future, the main objective of this paper is hence to examine 
how public procurement of GHG reductions from REDD+ by public agencies could be 
shaped to support results-based REDD+ activities and facilitate the development of robust 
accounting frameworks. Particular emphasis will be put on the public procurement rules in the 
context of the European Union (EU).  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. First, it discusses the merits and challenges of results-based 
payments within the ambit of REDD+. Second, it provides an overview of the goals and 
principles that govern public procurement and discusses their relevance for a tender for 
REDD+ credits. Third, it explores the legal boundaries set by European law for tendering 
processes carried out by public agencies in the European Union and section 4 draws 
conclusions.  
II. Results-based Finance for REDD+  
A. Defining Results-based Payments for REDD+ 
 
Results-based payments for REDD+ fall into a category of relatively new approaches towards 
Official Development Assistance (ODA), such as “cash-on-delivery” (COD) and “outcome-
based aid”, which condition donor payments on the achievement of particular results. 
Outcome-based systems link payments to the implementation of targeted, performance-related 
schemes within the national context. In some cases, donors link their payments to measurable 
and verifiable progress towards specific outcomes.  
8 Diaz et al. (2011).   
9 The adoption of international standards for market-based approaches for REDD+ is a controversial topic within 
the international climate negotiations.  See http://carbonmarketwatch.org/what-finance-for-redd/ 
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In the context of climate policy, results-based finance leverages private and public investment 
into activities that reduce GHG emissions and promote carbon removal. Baseline-and-credit 
systems similar to REDD+ are discussed in broader climate policy, particularly in the context 
of ‘nationally appropriate mitigation actions’ (NAMAs) of developing countries. Interesting 
lessons can also be learnt from the “green investment schemes” (GIS) implemented in Eastern 
Europe, which were developed to allow countries with a significant surplus in assigned 
amount units (AAUs) to receive funds for additional emission reductions.10  
 
In the case of REDD+, results that qualify for payment would be measured in terms of 
reductions of GHG emissions against a reference scenario or baseline. Additional benefits, 
such as those related to poverty reduction, water conservation, and biodiversity outcomes, 
could also be financially rewarded in this manner; although common metrics for these 
outcomes are generally less well developed. The credibility and acceptance of results-based 
finance frameworks depend on the rigour of the measurement methodologies applied, the 
conservativeness of the baseline scenario, and the transparency of the crediting scheme.11 
 
The emerging UNFCCC REDD+ mechanism follows a national approach, but allows the 
development of subnational systems as an interim step towards full REDD+ implementation 
at the national level. Before or after the adoption of a national reference level, a government 
can also decide to allow the development of subnational REDD+ programmes or REDD+ 
projects.  
 
Considering the challenges of building full national REDD+ systems, REDD+ is likely to be 
implemented in processes that move upwards taking a “step-wise approach” from project to 
sub-national level and eventually to national level. Given wide differences in social and 
environmental conditions, deforestation rates and technical capacities, sub-national-specific 
tailoring will indeed be important for many countries’ overall success with REDD+. It will 
provide an essential opportunity to test results-based payments in larger regions beyond 
projects and involving the public sector, but still on a smaller scale than entire national levels.  
 
Further, as deforestation and forest degradation drivers are often quite local in nature, 
different regions and even micro-regions require local implementation of response measures. 
These allow for interventions customized to suit a particular region and often produce far 
more successful results than uniform implementation of a national intervention. Finally, a 
step-wise building of reference level and measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) 
systems from covering a single activity (deforestation) to the full scope of REDD+ allows for 
a quick start of REDD+ while building capacities for a gradual expansion.  
 
B. Pro and cons of Results-based Payments for REDD+ 
 
10 Tuerk et al. (2010).  
11 Streck and Costenbader (2012). 
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With respect to traditional funding mechanisms results-based finance has several obvious 
advantages. It clearly enhances the incentives of the recipient to deliver the promised results. 
Overall, focusing on results creates a powerful incentive to improve spending effectiveness 
and associated MRV systems, which maximizes the potential of overall achievable GHG 
emission reductions and removals. This in turn might motivate contributors to increase their 
levels of commitment, knowing that funds will be spent only on reductions that are actually 
delivered. Finally, results-based payments have, in principle, the potential to leverage 
significant amounts of private finance. 
 
However, results-based finance is not without its challenges. For the recipients, it means that 
they have to bear the performance risk as no results means no payment. If the payments come 
from public sources, conflicts may arise about the strings attached to such payments, 
particularly if they come from ODA budgets, which have specific rules and requirements.12 
Also, donors may have to overcome fiscal constraints, such as the obligation to disburse 
approved funds during the budget year, or within a specified number of years, or the difficulty 
of earmarking reserve funds of unknown amounts for a certain number of years. Finally, 
donors may fear that the adopted design could lead to high transaction costs as well as 
windfall profits and/or perverse incentives as has been the case under the Kyoto Protocol 
(KP)’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).13  
 
Within the ambit of REDD+ performance-based payments face moreover some particularly 
intractable challenges, namely the lack of reliable data, additionality, the non-permanence of 
emission reductions, and potential leakage as well as unsettled questions regarding accounting 
and MRV.14 Many of the earlier problems plaguing forest carbon projects have, however, 
been progressively addressed so that, although not above criticism, many certification 
schemes (hereafter “standards”) have now achieved broader levels of acceptance.15  
 
Results-based standards that lead to the issuance of REDD+ credits differ in both scale and 
scope.16 The scale of REDD+ determines whether a standard applies to a jurisdiction or is 
defined by project boundaries. While national approaches are implemented at a jurisdictional 
(i.e. national) level, subnational approaches may be defined through a reference to a 
jurisdiction or at the project-level. The scope of a REDD+ programme depends on the types 
of activities that are included, i.e. reduced deforestation, reduced forest degradation, forest 
carbon enhancement, improved forest management and forest conservation.17  
 
While payments for carbon at the project level are possible in any country, programmes at a 
national level may not be an option for countries with weak governance that are not able to 
effectively reduce emissions within their borders. These countries lack control over the 
resource and are not only unable to effectively implement policies but also to defend their 
12 See for instance the Paris declaration on aid effectiveness.  
13 See de Sépibus (2011).  
14 European Commission (2008).  
15 Diaz et al. (2011: 63); Roe et al. (2013). 
16 Streck and Costenbader (2012).  
17 Idem. 
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forest estate against international drivers of deforestation (such as commodity prices or 
international leakage effects). Incentives would have to be targeted to those who are likely to 
respond to them, the economic agents in the field such as farmers, communities and private 
entities.18 
III. Public procurement of REDD+ Credits  
The procurement of REDD+ credits can be realized through a purchase agreement with a 
single party or through calls for tenders, which is a process by which public sector bodies buy 
goods, works and services through a competitive bidding process.19 Probably the most 
important goal of all tendering processes is that the procuring entity acquires them on the best 
possible terms, i.e. that it gets value for money.20 Other goals, such as the prevention of 
corruption, accountability, fair and equal treatment of providers, implementation of so-called 
horizontal issues (e.g. environmental, social), and efficiency, however, are also important 
objectives pursued by tenders.21  
A. The Rationale for a Tender  
The advantages of a tender over negotiations with one single party are manifold.22 The 
recourse to results-based payments for verified emissions reductions is indeed only “half the 
recipe for cost-effectiveness”.23 The other half is a competitive allocation process, which 
allows the economically most advantageous project to be picked. 
In the absence of competition, a supplier of REDD+ credits has few incentives to reduce its 
costs and will seek to maximize its profits at the expense of the buyer.24 As the buyer has no 
yardstick against which it can measure the offer, he is prone to paying too much. By 
introducing competition, the danger that the supplier will make an unreasonable offer is less 
important as that supplier may lose the contract if the price is too high and/or the quality too 
low. Hence, the greater the number of competitors, the more the risk that the supplier may 
unduly exaggerate its costs to seek rents at the expense of the buyer is minimized.  
Furthermore, in a transaction with one single supplier, there is a significant risk that the 
supplier will withhold crucial information.25 Forcing suppliers to compete ensures that they 
will have to disclose the information they possess, namely the information regarding price, 
products and costs. Contestability thus assists the public buyer in the price discovering 
process and compels him to operate more effectively. Finally, by encouraging competition, 
the public buyer will have a greater choice and variety of possible options that satisfy his 
needs.  
18 Karsenty and Ongolo (2012).  
19 Many public procurement laws are based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement, which 
contains procedures and principles aimed at achieving value for money and avoiding abuses in the procurement 
process. See http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/procurement_infrastructure/2011Model.html. 
20 Arrowsmith (2010a: 14).  
21 Arrowsmith (2010a: 13).  
22 See on the merits of a call for tender for CDM credits with sustainability benefits Gantenbein (2012). 
23 Gosh et al. (2012: 6). 
24 Trepte (2006: 115).  
25 Idem.  
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The benefits of competitive bidding, however, are not limited to the optimization of the 
suppliers’ offers. A government buyer is not a buyer in the market like any other individual 
buyer, motivated purely by self-interest and acting to maximize utility.26 The purchasing 
activity is generally carried out by a bureaucratic entity whose self-interest may diverge from 
the government’s interests and whose primary objective may not be to maximize profits. 
There is thus a tendency towards inefficiency and, in the worst cases, even a risk of corrupt 
practices. The recourse to a transparent bidding process that obliges the procurement authority 
to specify its objectives in a transparent and objective way will thus help the government to 
control its purchasing agent and thereby limit its discretionary power. Potential abuses may 
further be reduced if competitors are entitled to take judicial action if the criteria underlying 
the tendering process are violated.  
 
A selection process based on competitive bidding, however, will not automatically lead to the 
optimal purchase decision by the public buyer. Indeed, contestability is only as effective as 
the competitive forces at work in the market and assumes that the suppliers compete on fair 
terms. The outcome will also very much depend on the type of rules that regulate the 
government procurement. Also, it is important to be aware that the recourse to competitive 
bidding is clearly not without costs. It often entails substantial transaction costs, both for the 
public buyer who conducts the search and for the potential suppliers who submit responses.27 
The tendering process will hence have to be designed in such a way that its costs do not 
exceed its benefits. 
 
B. Particularities of Tenders for REDD+ Credits  
 
The idea of a tendering procedure for the purchase of carbon credits is not entirely new. In 
2000, the Dutch government was the first to make a call for tenders for Joint Implementation 
(JI) and CDM credits. Its example was followed by the Austrian, the Danish, the Swedish, the 
Finnish and eventually the Belgian governments. While all tenders were primarily intended to 
allow countries to comply with their mitigation targets under the KP, the Belgian government 
placed a particular emphasis on the purchase of credits that would contribute to the 
sustainable development of host countries.28  
 
A tender for REDD+ credits may thus build upon the experience that has been gained from 
the past tenders for JI and CDM credits. While similar with respect to the nature of the object, 
the tender for REDD+ credits differs from past procedures in several respects. The earlier 
tenders were all undertaken in the context of the KP, which allowed developed countries to 
use the credits to comply with their mitigation targets thereunder.  
 
The situation is different in the case of tenders for REDD+ credits. So far, the KP does not 
allow the use of CDM credits from the forestry sector, other than with respect to afforestation 
26 Trepte (2006: 84 ff). 
27 Trepte (2006: 123).  
28 See http://www.climatechange.be/jicdmtender/article.php3?id_article=47#proc. 
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and reforestation projects. In the absence of a new international climate agreement laying 
down rules for GHG accounting and new market mechanisms29 countries which have not 
adopted post-2012 targets under the KP may however possibly use REDD+ credits for 
compliance with their mitigation pledges made under the Cancun Agreements.30  
 
Another difference from the previous tenders is that a call for tenders for REDD+ credits 
cannot refer to UN standards, but has to refer to standards developed by the voluntary markets 
or to define its own standards. Also, REDD+ credits are not only project-related but may be 
defined at both the subnational and national jurisdictional levels. This implies that the 
contracting parties of procuring entities may, for certain tenders, be exclusively public 
entities. Finally, while REDD+ credits resemble other carbon credits in that they are 
construed with respect to a counterfactual baseline, their design requires that specific risks 
related the forestry sector are addressed, such as the non-permanence of emission reductions 
and particularly complex MRV issues.31  
 
C. Tendering Procedures 
Tendering procedures usually conform to a similar pattern. The procurement entity issues a 
request for tenders, in which it outlines what is required and/or what its needs are. It provides 
detailed instructions on the requirements of the bid as well as on the award criteria according 
to which the bids will be evaluated. It is generally widely advertised to encourage competition 
and provide a significant pool of offers to select from. The party whose offer best meets the 
outlined requirements is offered a contract.  
1. Different Types of Procedures  
Depending on the objectives that are pursued by the procuring entity, different procedures are 
possible. The standard procedure is the open procedure, which ensures the maximum 
contestability between suppliers.32 It is generally a one-stage procedure, also called one 
envelope, because the tender document contains all the elements necessary for the bid on 
which the contract will be based. In many circumstances, however, an open procedure may 
prove too inflexible and/or too costly as the procurement entity might have to make a 
selection from too vast a pool of offers. Thus, very often, the procedure will be preceded by a 
pre-qualification procedure, which sets out certain conditions that must be fulfilled before a 
bid can be made. Another possible way to restrict the number of bidders is to follow a 
procedure where only a limited number of competitors are invited to submit an offer.33 This 
type of procedure is usually called a restricted procedure.  
29 See for a discussion on new market mechanisms de Sépibus et al. (2011, 2012).  
30 See FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, 1/CP.16, available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf#page=2 
31 See Sullivan et al. (2012: 20). 
32 Trepte (2006: 280). 
33 Contrary to the prequalification procedure where participation in the tendering process depends on whether or 
not the candidates meet the qualification criteria set out by the procuring entity, in the so-called selective 
tendering process the procuring entity chooses those it  invites to bid. See Trepte (2006: 275).  
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In the two-stage tenders the process is divided up in two distinct tendering phases. This option 
is usually used for procedures where it is not possible to define precisely the object of the 
tender at the outset.34 The procuring entity first invites the bidders to present a proposal, 
which will serve as the basis for negotiations between the bidders and the procuring entity.35 
Based on a revised request for tender, bidders that have been qualified in the first stage 
present a second and final tender.36  
 
A special tendering technique, which was progressively introduced by many countries with 
the start of the new millennium, is the electronic reverse auction. This enables bidders to 
adjust their tenders in the light of the information submitted in the tenders by other bidders.37 
Electronic auctions are not another type of procedure, but rather a particular way of 
conducting the award process. They may be used as part of open, restricted or negotiated 
procedures.38 
 
The type of procedure that tenders follow markedly influences their outcome. When selecting 
the procedure used in the call of tenders for REDD+ credits, the public authorities have to 
carefully evaluate the advantages and trade-offs of the various modalities. While an open 
procedure with few or no prequalification criteria promotes choice and variety, it may easily 
overburden the logistic and personnel resources of a procuring entity. Conversely, a restricted 
procedure will be able to target potentially interesting projects and participants and reduce 
transaction costs, but may unduly limit the benefits of competition.  
 
The advantage of the two-stage tendering procedure is that it allows the procuring entity to 
engage in negotiations with some of the bidders to gain a more in-depth understanding of the 
merits of a specific proposal. This is particularly important for tendering procedures where the 
procuring entity does not know exactly which solutions best meet its needs. This type of 
procedure, which is usually used for particularly complex tenders, provides more flexibility to 
the parties but also increases the risks that the procedure may be misused for other purposes. 
 
2. Lessons from Past Tenders for Carbon Credits  
 
The tenders for CDM and JI credits undertaken by the Dutch, Austrian, Danish, Swedish, 
Finnish and Belgian governments followed different procedural modalities. The Dutch 
authorities, for instance, opted for the so-called “restricted procedure”,39 which consisted of a 
pre-selection and a contract awarding phase. Potential bidders were asked to send an 
expression of interest, in which they had to disclose their financial and economic standing as 
34 Arrowsmith ( 2010a: 37). According to Art. 30 of the UNCITRAL model law the procuring entity may have 
recourse to these procedures in particular if “discussions with suppliers or contractors are needed to refine 
aspects of the description of the subject matter of the procurement …. and in order to allow the procuring entity 
to obtain the most satisfactory solution to its procurement needed”. 
35 Under the UNCITRAL Model law the first tender does not include the price. See Article 30 of the 
UNCITRAL Model law 2011.  
36 Trepte (2006: 295).  
37 Arrowsmith (2010b: 253). 
38 Idem.  
39 Dutch State (2000).  
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well as their technical capacity.40 These expressions of interests were then assessed according 
to qualitative selection criteria,41 based on which a ranking of the projects was established. 
The parties with the highest ranking were invited to submit a tender.  
 
In the contract-awarding phase bidders were offered the opportunity to present their proposals 
to the assessment team personally and the staff of the procuring entity usually carried out on-
site visits, where it inspected local premises and interviewed project participants as well as 
stakeholders in the host country. The assessment made by the staff was then submitted to a 
committee of independent experts whose assent was mandatory.  
 
Projects that were assessed positively were offered a contract. Overall, the Dutch government 
organised five tenders that led to the conclusion of about twenty JI and sixteen CDM credit 
purchase agreements. The average price per unit of CO2 equivalent was about ten euros for JI 
projects and between three and five dollars for CDM projects.42 Based on the fulfilment of 
certain conditions, prepayments were granted to project developers from JI tenders.  
  
The Belgian procurement entity applied in its three tenders43 the so-called “negotiation 
procedure with public announcement”, which may be chosen if the nature of the services that 
have to be delivered are not of a nature that the requirements of the contract can be specified 
with sufficient accuracy.44 Although the Belgian authorities followed the same procedure for 
all tenders, the modalities of the first two tenders differed substantially from the third tender.  
 
The first two Belgian tenders show many similarities to the Dutch tenders. Project developers 
were invited to send an expression of interest – including a project idea note – in which the 
personal qualifications and the technical capacity of the candidates were examined. Based on 
this first screening of the projects, some candidates were invited to submit a tender, including 
in particular a project development document (PDD). In contrast to the Dutch tender, which 
directly concluded a purchase agreement if the bid was assessed positively, the Belgian 
authorities engaged in negotiations regarding the financial modalities if a project was selected 
based on the award criteria set out in the bidding documents. The upper limit of a so-called 
“Emission Reduction Purchase Agreement” (ERPA) was a 2.3 million euros per project.45 A 
financial contribution of 40,000 Euros was offered to every complete and compliant project 
proposal and an additional financial contribution of 10,000 Euros to candidates from least 
developed countries to support feasibility studies. Pre-payments of up to 50% were made 
conditional on the meeting of certain milestones.  
 
The third Belgian tender differed from the two first tenders mainly with respect to its scope. 
Instead of issuing a call for tenders for individual projects, the Belgian state issued a call for 
40 The selection criteria relate to three particular points: the project definition, the operational plan and the 
experience of the bidder.  
41 The criteria related to the definition of the project, the operational plan and the experience of the proponents. 
See Dutch State (2001).  
42 This information was provided to the author by former staff of the Dutch procuring entity.  
43 The three tenders were launched in 2005, 2007 and 2009. 
44 See  http://www.climatechange.be/jicdmtender/article.php3?id_article=47#proc. 
45 See http://www.climatechange.be/jicdmtender/article.php3?id_article=47#proc. 
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tenders for the purchase of a portfolio of projects. This choice meant that instead of project 
developers, financial intermediaries were the principal contracting parties of the procuring 
entity. The main reason for narrowing down the scope of the tender was the rationalization of 
the work of the procuring entity. Whereas in the first two calls for tenders the procuring entity 
had to assess the merits of hundreds of individual projects, the portfolio approach allowed it 
to concentrate on the assessment of a few proposals whose projects had been previously 
screened and selected by financial intermediaries. In contrast to the first tenders, no financial 
contributions nor pre-payments were offered to bidders.    
3. What Tender Modalities for REDD+ Credits? 
 
The question of what type of procedure should be followed when organizing a tendering 
procedure for REDD+ credits may not receive a straightforward answer. It will, among other 
criteria, depend on the type of credits that are being tendered for as well as the scope of the 
tender.  
 
If the purchasing state aims at purchasing REDD+ credits with a subnational or national 
scope, it is important that that the selected procedure provides sufficient flexibility. A rigid 
procedure that is based exclusively on paperwork evaluation will not guarantee an appropriate 
outcome. Only if the procuring entities are offered the opportunity to engage in an in-depth 
dialogue with bidders, to interview stakeholders and carry out on-site assessments will they be 
able to make a sufficiently well-founded judgment on the merits of a proposal.  
 
Moreover, a two-stage procedure that provides ample room for iterative biddings will in this 
case probably offer the best guarantees for tailor-made solutions. Discussions can be led with 
the bidders and their initial offer may be subsequently adjusted. While such a procedure may 
be warranted for REDD+ credits with a national or subnational scope, it is important to keep 
in mind that this type of procedure comes with substantial transaction costs that may possibly 
only be kept in check if the number of proposals examined is limited. Accordingly, the 
benefits normally entailed by a competitive bidding process are reduced and the procedure 
may not offer much added-value in comparison to a purchase agreement with one single 
supplier.  
 
A distinction should also be drawn between a call for credits from individual projects or 
programmes and a call related to a portfolio of projects or programmes. While in the first 
case, a thorough assessment of the merits of each project, including on-site assessments and 
personal interviews with stakeholders, is essential to ensure the integrity of the purchased 
credits, this may neither be necessary nor possible under a portfolio approach. As in the latter 
case the assessment of the individual projects is carried out by the intermediary, the main 
objective of the authorities will be to check its reputation and background and its compliance 
with the criteria set out by the bidding instrument. While allowing a lower degree of scrutiny 
of the individual projects, the principal advantage of the portfolio approach is clearly its 
reduced transaction costs.   
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Finally, cost-efficiency concerns may be addressed by the introduction of an electronic 
reverse auction. As this technique allows a dynamic adjustment of the bids with respect to 
other offers, it may, if used in an appropriate manner, significantly improve the chances of 
getting better value for money.46 When used in a tendering procedure for REDD+ credits, it 
may constitute an effective tool to help in the discovery of cheap abatement opportunities. 
Sufficient safeguards will however have to be established to prevent it from leading to the 
promotion of proposals that promote emission reductions at the expense of other valuable 
goals.  
D. The Object of the Tender   
 
The objects of calls for tenders are usually goods, services and/or works, which are defined 
through reference to their technical specifications or in terms of performance or functional 
requirements. REDD+ credits are not goods, services or works in a classical sense. When 
defining the object of the tender the procuring entity may thus not refer to their technical 
characteristics, but rather to the procedures and modalities that lead to their issuance. 
 
With the exception of the first Dutch call for tender, reference could be made in all previous 
calls for tenders for carbon credits to the carbon standards established under the KP.47 Failing 
UN standards for REDD+ credits,48 the procuring entity, in the case of the purchase of this 
type of credits, may not refer to procedures and modalities recognized by the international 
community.  
 
This resembles the situation of the first Dutch call for tenders launched in 2000. Although the 
JI credits could potentially be used for compliance under the KP, the Parties had not yet 
formally adopted the procedures and modalities for this type of credits.49 Hence, for the sake 
of the first “ERU-PT Emission Reduction Unit Procurement Tender” the Netherlands had, 
based on the guidelines under discussion in the ambit of the international climate negotiations, 
formulated a practical calculation method for emission reductions.50 It had, in particular, laid 
down the procedures that project developers would have to follow when executing their 
baseline study, given instructions for monitoring studies and clarified that they would have to 
be validated by an independent validation body recognized by the Parties to the KP. While the 
Dutch procuring entity expected that, at the time of the issuance of the first credits in the first 
year of the commitment period of the KP, the Parties would have adopted international rules, 
it clarified that if this was not the case, the Netherlands would take care of these issues.   
 
The call for REDD+ differs from the first Dutch tendering procedure insofar as the KP 
excludes (so far) the use of new types of carbon credits for compliance purposes. Also, no 
consensus has yet emerged in the climate negotiations with respect to the establishment of 
46 Idem.  
47 The modalities and procedures for the CDM and the JI were adopted by Parties to the Kyoto Protocol in 
2001in the framework of the so-called Marrakesh Accords of the UNFCCC.  
48 The only standards that exist for the forestry sector are the standards established for reforestation and 
afforestation under the CDM and the JI.  
49 This occurred only in 2001 under the Marrakesh Accords.  
50 See Dutch government (2000). 
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international standards for new market mechanisms in the post-2020 period. In contrast to the 
situation in 2000, however, there exist numerous voluntary carbon certification schemes 
which have been developed by civil society. They include project-level certificates as well as 
sub-national and national certification schemes.51 Some are “pure” carbon standards such as 
the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) others include rewards for co-benefits, such as the 
preservation of biodiversity.  
 
When describing the object of a call for REDD+ credits, procuring entities may hence either 
refer to existing voluntary certification standards or provide guidance on substantial and 
procedural criteria that any standard would have to meet. The advantage of referring to 
existing standards is that authorities can refer to existing structures which have already proven 
their robustness within the ambit of the voluntary carbon market. Moreover, the reference to a 
particular standard does not prevent the procuring entities from formulating additional 
“sustainability” requirements, taking the example on the Belgian tenders.  
E. The Definition of Award Criteria  
 
A tender may be awarded either on the basis of the criterion of the lowest price or the 
economically most advantageous offer. The lowest price basis is usually only used for simple 
purchases where the quality of the items purchased does not matter. When considering the 
most economically advantageous tender, the procuring entity may therefore consider all 
relevant factors, including social and environmental aspects. Usually, it will indicate in the 
bidding document to what extent these factors will be taken into account. This can in 
particular be done through the “relative weighting” of the award criteria. The procuring entity 
can for instance assign a certain percentage to the price factor and another to the quality of the 
items offered, e.g. 70% for the price and 30% for the quality.  
 
In contrast to the Dutch tenders, the award of the Belgian tenders made allowance for 
“sustainability” criteria and for indicators providing “certainty of delivery” of credits. The 
first two tenders proposed a four-step assessment, starting with a classification of the projects 
in six categories.52 In the second step, each proposal was assessed according to the criteria set 
out in the bidding documents. The projects were then ranked according to a ratio set out in the 
bidding documents. Finally, proposals were selected for further negotiation by choosing, in a 
descending ranking order, the top-ranked projects out of each of the six categories until the 
budget was exhausted.  
 
In the third Belgian tender, the procuring entity made the ranking of projects dependent on 
sustainability scores. The adopted “sustainability” criteria are interesting in several respects. 
They were based on an overall assessment of three categories of criteria, outlining 
environmental, social and developmental aspects of a portfolio, which were weighted equally 
51 See for a list of schemes Chapas et al. (2013).  
52 The categories were 1.energy efficiency projects; 2. renewable energy projects; 3. energy production by using 
clean, sustainably grown biomass; 4. small scale projects; 5. projects in Africa, in a least developed country 
(LDC) or in a partner country from the Belgian Development Cooperation; 6. others. See 
http://www.climatechange.be/jicdmtender/article.php3?id_article=47#proc. 
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(30 points out of a hundred). Moreover, an extra ten points could be awarded depending on 
the potential of a project to contribute to the saving of non-renewable energy sources. While 
providing an equal weight to each of the three components of sustainable development, this 
approach allowed the Belgian authorities to put the emphasis on an element it particularly 
wanted to foster.  
 
To strike a balance between cost-efficiency and sustainability criteria the Belgian authorities 
decided to rank the projects according to a so-called “Coefficient Price”. The maximum 
number of points (100) was allocated to the projects with the lowest Coefficient Price/unit of 
emission reduction. The latter was the result of the offered price minus a “discount” if the 
project was assessed positively with respect to its contribution to the sustainable development 
of the host country. For instance, projects with a “very high” sustainability score were granted 
a higher discount than projects with only a high score. Projects with a low or no sustainability 
score did not benefit from any discount. As a result, projects with high sustainability scores 
were paid a premium.  
 
The formulation of award criteria for the purchase of REDD+ credits deserves special 
attention. If the aim of the tender is to reward co-benefits concurrently with the achievement 
of GHG emission reductions, the award criteria will have to reflect this preference. This may 
be done by assigning a certain percentage to the price factor and another to the type of 
projects or programmes it wants to favour. The procuring entity could for instance privilege 
proposals that aim at protecting forests with a high level of biodiversity or at promoting the 
livelihoods of indigenous people. Another option is to follow one of the examples provided by 
the Belgian tenders, which formulated sustainability criteria against which the projects were 
assessed and ranked. Yet another possibility is to rank REDD+ standards with respect to their 
inclusion of environmental and social co-benefits and attribute them different “weights”. 
Projects or programmes fulfilling standards that are ranked higher with respect to their 
contribution to sustainability could for instance be rewarded with a premium price.  
 
F. Positive and Negative Lists of Eligible Projects or Programmes 
 
Other than setting prequalification conditions with respect to the personal qualifications and 
technical capacity of applicants, a procuring entity may want to exclude certain types of 
REDD+ credits. This option was chosen by the Belgian authorities, which ruled out any 
projects related to land-use and forest projects as well as projects involving nuclear energy 
and large hydro dams. Another possibility for narrowing down the scope of the tender is to 
limit the tender to a positive list of eligible projects. For instance, public authorities may wish 
exclusively to buy credits from avoided deforestation in areas of high biodiversity and with a 
high social added value. Such a tender would clearly target some projects at the expense of 
others. While the public authorities may have valid grounds for choosing such an option, the 
full potential of the tender to promote a process of discovery of cheap abatement opportunities 
would be limited accordingly.  
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G. Host Country Eligibility Criteria  
 
Under the CDM, the host country must approve the project and confirm that the project 
activity assists it in achieving sustainable development.53 The rationale of these requirements 
goes back to the double goal of the CDM, which is to allow developed countries to contribute 
to reducing atmospheric concentrations of GHGs, while promoting sustainable development 
in developing countries.  
 
Furthermore, only countries that are a Party to the KP and have established a national 
authority are entitled to host CDM projects. The establishment of a national institution is 
important to ensure efficient and transparent treatment of project applications and to assess 
local sustainability benefits and costs. It may however also assume other roles, such as 
providing guidelines on project approval criteria and information about projects and financial 
opportunities for local projects.54  
 
Mirroring the conditions set by the KP for CDM projects, a call for REDD+ credits could 
make the tender conditional on the approval by the host country. In addition to the approval of 
the host country, procuring entities may wish to limit the tender to projects or programmes 
where the host country has entered into an agreement with the “purchasing” state. Such an 
agreement may serve several purposes. The purchasing state may want to make sure that there 
is a national institution responsible for the approval of a project or programme. Furthermore, 
an agreement might specify that the host country will support its successful implementation. 
Finally, the purchasing country may wish to ensure that the emission reductions achieved 
through the project or programme will not lead to double counting in the international context 
of climate change negotiations.   
H. Payment Conditions  
 
Contracting parties may agree that payments shall be made against delivery of the certificate 
that attests that purchased emission reductions have been realized. While in conformity with 
the idea of results-based payments, this mode of payment may be quite unattractive given that 
emission reductions projects and programmes generally entail large upfront investments that 
may take place over long periods of time. To provide for a more balanced allocation of risks 
between the purchaser and the tenderers, the possibility of making pre-payments should thus 
be considered. For instance, the Dutch, as well as the Belgian authorities in the first two 
tenders, agreed to make pre-payments if certain clearly verifiable milestones were achieved.55  
 
IV.  Tenders for REDD+ Credits in the Context of the European Union  
A. The case for calls for REDD+ Credits by the EU and its Member States  
 
53 See 3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 40(a). 
54 See for more information http://www.cdmcapacity.org/how_prepare_CDM/encourage_land_use.html. 
55 See Belgian state (2005).   
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Pilot schemes that help to establish the environmental credibility of REDD+ and inform 
policy makers in donor and recipient countries greatly contribute to accelerating the transition 
from “readiness” towards the implementation of results-based actions.56 While California 
under its “Governor’s initiative”57 and Norway58 through its bilateral agreements with Brazil, 
Guyana and Indonesia are actively exploring new avenues, the EU has provided little 
leadership.  
 
Although the EU has been a frontrunner in recognizing CDM credits in its emission trading 
scheme (ETS), it has remained very cautious when it comes to accepting carbon credits from 
the forestry sector. This is notably motivated by its fear that the acceptance of REDD+ credits 
would further undermine the functioning of its ETS, which already faces a massive 
oversupply of credits. Hence, while not rejecting the idea of forestry credits altogether, it has 
posited that they should first be tested for government compliance before they can be 
recognized within the EU ETS.59 So far, however, the EU has not proposed any follow-up 
action. This is unfortunate, as the success of REDD+ will crucially depend on the more active 
involvement of the EU.  
 
It is suggested here that the EU and its Member States could increase their contribution to 
REDD+ by embracing a two-pronged approach. The EU could, on the one hand, take a 
unilateral commitment to increase its current mitigation target for 2020 from 20% to 30%60 
under the UNFCCC, without submitting this supplementary commitment to the rules of the 
KP. This would allow its Member States to meet some of their new obligations by procuring 
emission reductions from REDD+. On the other hand, or in the case that no consensus 
emerges regarding a more ambitious mitigation target, the EU and/or its Member States could 
create a REDD+ fund which would allocate part of its budget to the acquisition of REDD+ 
credits to support pilots for results-based payment schemes. 
B. EU Public procurement rules  
 
Public procurement in the Member States of the EU is regulated both by national and 
European law and, in specific cases, also by the Global Procurement Agreement (GPA).61 In 
this section we will examine whether and to what extent EU law applies to the purchase of 
REDD+ credits by public agencies of its Member States.  
 
56 Sterk (2012: 20). 
57 California concluded an agreement in 2009 with 19 states and provinces from Indonesia to Peru to assist the 
creation of sub-national programmes that reduce GHG emissions from deforestation and degradation using the 
carbon market as a financial incentive. It has yet to decide whether the credits that these schemes might deliver 
will be accepted under its emission trading scheme. See http://stateredd.org/group-advises-california-on-
accepting-redd-credits/. 
58 See for more information on the Norwegian initiative 
http://www.regjeringen.no/templates/RedaksjonellArtikkel.aspx?id=547202&epslanguage=EN-GB. 
59 European Commission (2008).  
60 The EU has committed to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 20% in 2020 with respect to the baseline in 
1990 under the second commitment period of the KP.  
61 The GPA has been adopted within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
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The EU has adopted several directives whose prerequisites have to be fulfilled when public 
authorities seek to acquire supplies, services, or works that exceed certain thresholds. Their 
purpose is to open up the national public procurement markets to all economic actors and 
ensure a level playing field within the EU. Furthermore, EU primary law, in particular its 
principles of non-discrimination, equal treatment and transparency, applies.62  
 
C. The Public Sector Directive  
 
The Public Sector Directive (hereafter the “Directive”) is the principal legal instrument 
governing the purchase of works, products and/or services by public authorities of Member 
States of the EU.63 For the Directive to apply, the tender for REDD+ credits must be issued by 
one of the public authorities64 mentioned therein, exceed the indicated thresholds and be 
covered by its material and geographical scope.  
1. The material scope of the Directive 
 
The Directive sets out rules for tenders for works, products and/or services. 65 As a work is 
defined as “the outcome of building or civil engineering works”, only the meaning of the 
terms “product” and “service” deserve further scrutiny. Whereas the term “product” is not 
further defined by the Directive, Annex II contains a list of services, notably a heading 
entitled “other services”.  
So far, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has not clarified whether the 
supply of carbon credits may be qualified as a service or as a product or good in the sense of 
the Directive. According to its jurisprudence “goods are products which can be valued in 
money and which are capable, as such, of forming the subject of commercial transactions”.66 
REDD+ credits are traded like commodities in the voluntary market and thus clearly have a 
monetary value. This suggests that they may be qualified as goods. The Belgian authorities 
considered in their tender that the supply of CDM credits constitutes a service.67 This 
interpretation is supported by the fact that the credits were used to fulfil the Belgian 
mitigation commitments under the KP.  
In the absence of further guidance by the CJEU, the legal nature of carbon credits may be 
explored in the light of the doctrine. The question has in particular been addressed by legal 
scholars in the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO). While some authors 
argue that carbon credits have no intrinsic value and may not be qualified as goods under 
WTO law others qualify them as intangible investment goods.68 Other authors support the 
62 The EU public procurement rules apply to all its 27 Member States as well as to countries that have ratified the 
GPA. 
63 Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of 
procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts, O.J. L 
134 , 3.4.2004, pp.114–240. 
64 See Annex III of the Directive.  
65 See Article 1.2 (a) of the Directive.  
66 Case of the European Court of Justice, Commission v Italy, “Italian Art”, 7/68, ECR 1968, p. 4 
67 See http://www.climatechange.be/jicdmtender/article.php3?id_article=47#proc. 
68 Kulovesi (2011: 241) 
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view that, rather than goods, carbon credits resemble securities and thus have to be considered 
as financial services in the sense of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).69  
It may safely be said that no consensus has so far emerged regarding the legal nature of 
carbon credits. Strong arguments however militate in favour of their qualification as goods or 
services in the sense of the Directive. Given the aim of the Directive to allow public entities to 
achieve a goal on the best economic terms, there are good reasons to apply its rules also to 
credits, which are used to achieve cost-efficient emission reductions. 
2. The territorial scope of the Directive 
Another issue that needs to be examined is whether the Directive applies to tenders for 
REDD+ credits that are defined by a jurisdictional baseline, be it national or sub-national. 
This type of tender is distinct from others, as only public entities from third countries may 
submit them. This raises two questions. The first is whether public entities can qualify as 
“economic operators” in the sense of the Directive and the second is, if the answer to the first 
question is in the affirmative, whether the tenders are covered by the territorial scope of the 
Directive.  
Parties to public procurement contracts are usually undertakings pursuing economic 
objectives. The CJEU has so far not clarified whether the Directive may also apply to public 
entities. In analogy to the jurisprudence developed in the ambit of European competition law 
one may argue that public entities may well pursue economic objectives on the same terms as 
private undertakings and thus qualify as “economic operators”. This argument is supported by 
the overriding goal of EU procurement law which is to open up government markets to free 
trade. Accordingly, there are no compelling reasons to exclude in principle public entities 
which pursue economic interests as this is the case for the sale of carbon credits.  
The final question is whether a call to which only public entities from third countries may 
respond falls under the territorial scope of the Directive. So far none of the traditional 
rainforest countries70 has ratified the GPA,71 which extends the geographical scope of the 
Directive to the operators of those countries. It is thus safe to say that calls for tenders for 
REDD+ credits that are exclusively defined by jurisdictional baselines from rainforest 
countries are not covered by the territorial scope of the Directive.  
3. Four types of procedures 
 
Procuring entities have the choice between four types of procedures: an open, a restricted, a 
negotiated and a competitive dialogue procedure. The open and restricted procedures 
represent the standard procedures and follow the same pattern. The procuring entity defines in 
69 Idem.  
70 The rainforest nations are Brazil, Congo, Peru, Indonesia, Columbia, Bolivia, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Ecuador, Gabon, Guyana, India, Laos, Malaysia, Mexico, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, Republic of 
Congo, Suriname, and Venezuela. 
71 The GPA has notably been signed by all the EU Member States, Hong Kong, China, Iceland, Israel, Japan, 
Korea, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland, Chinese Taipei and the United States.  
 19 
                                                 
the bidding document the prequalification that must be met, sets up the technical 
specifications of the bid72 and formulates the award criteria, according to which the bids will 
be evaluated. The conditions for the bid are then made public through a public notice in the 
Official Journal of the European Union. The tenderers that fulfil the prequalification criteria 
are allowed to submit their bids within the defined time frame. The procuring entity then 
assesses them according to the award criteria set out in the bidding document and awards the 
contract.  
 
In contrast to the standard procedure, the negotiated procedure allows the procuring entity to 
engage in negotiations with the tenderers with respect to their initial offer. In this phase, the 
procuring entity enjoys significant freedom to structure the procedure.73 It is for instance 
empowered to make a selection of preferred bidders, to take recourse to iterative tendering 
and/or to phase out participants progressively. At the same time, bidders have significant 
possibilities to amend their offers after negotiations. In all phases, however, the principles of 
transparency and equal treatment will have to be given due regard.74  
 
In the competitive dialogue procedure, the basic structure changes. Instead of requiring tender 
specifications, it suffices if the procuring entity provides a “descriptive document” that 
informs bidders about its needs and requirements.75 Based on the information received, the 
procuring authority selects from among the participants that meet the prequalification 
criteria76 the ones it deems the most suitable.77 The award phase starts with a “dialogue” 
phase, for which the Directive provides significant flexibility.  
 
All aspects of the contract can be discussed with the chosen candidates during this dialogue.78 
For example, the authority can ask for initial outline tenders that set out the tendering firm’s 
proposed solutions and key terms, can discuss these outlines with the firms, and then ask them 
to revise them to make them better meet the authority’s needs in light of the discussions, prior 
to the final tender.79 During the dialogue, the procuring entity has to ensure equality of 
treatment among all bidders and may not reveal confidential information disclosed by one 
participant to the others without his/her agreement.80 At the end of the dialogue the authority 
may specify a single solution against which all tenderers submit their final bids or it may ask 
each tenderer to submit a bid that includes its own solution. After the formal closing of this 
phase, a call for “final tenders” is put out to the remaining participants. Based on these bids, 
the procuring entity must then choose the most economically advantageous tender.81  
72 See Article 23 of the Directive. 
73 Arrowsmith (2010b: 197). 
74 Arrowsmith (20010b: 197). 
75 Art. 1 11 (c) of the Directive : “…a procedure in which any economic operator may request to participate and 
whereby the Contracting Authority conducts a dialogue with the candidates admitted to that procedure, with the 
aim of developing one or more suitable alternatives capable of meeting its requirements, and on the basis of 
which the candidates chosen are invited to tender”. 
76 The Directive limits the prequalification criteria to the following characteristics: economic and financial 
standing; technical and professional ability.  
77 The minimum number of tenderers to be invited is 3. 
78 Burnett (2009: 19).  
79 Arrowsmith (2010b: 186 ff.). 
80 Burnett (2009: 19).  
81 Article 29 (7) of the Directive. 
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As discussed above, the choice of the appropriate procedure for tenders for REDD+ credits, 
depends on various criteria. Suffice it to say here that the negotiated procedure and the 
competitive dialogue procedure can only be used in well-defined circumstances. The recourse 
to the negotiated procedure is for instance allowed in the case of services if “the nature of the 
services to be provided is such that contract specifications cannot be established with 
sufficient precision”82 or, more generally, if the nature of the tender object, or the risks 
attached to performance, are such “as not to permit prior overall pricing”.83 The competitive 
dialogue is reserved for particularly complex contracts, where “Member States consider that 
the use of the open or restricted procedure will not allow the award of the contract”. 
 
When defining the award criteria procuring entities may refer to a list of factors, including 
inter alia the quality the price, the technical merit, aesthetic and functional characteristics, 
environmental characteristics, running costs and cost-effectiveness.84 All criteria must 
however be related to the subject matter85 of the contract and may not be “essentially linked 
to the tenderer’s ability to perform the contract in question”.86 Moreover, they may not confer 
an unrestricted freedom of choice on the procuring entity and have to comply with the 
fundamental principles of Community law, in particular the principle of non-discrimination.87 
The principle of equal treatment implies notably “an obligation of transparency in order to 
enable compliance with it to be verified”.88  
 
Procuring entities enjoy wide discretion as to how to weigh the different award criteria.89 For 
instance, the CJEU posited that nothing prevented a procuring entity from attributing a 
weighting of 45% for environmental criteria.90 They do, however, have to be formulated in 
such a way “as to allow all reasonably well-informed and normally diligent tenderers to 
interpret them in the same way”.91 If sub-criteria and weightings are developed, they must be 
disclosed as well.92 In the case Concordia Buses the CJEU further stated that environmental 
criteria must be “specific” and “quantifiable”.93  
 
In the case of a competitive dialogue procedure, the procuring entity must specify the award 
criteria in the descriptive document and indicate how they will be weighted. This can be 
82 Article 30 (1) (c) of the Directive. 
83 Article 30 (1) (b) of the Directive.  
84 Art. 53 par. 1 (a) of the Directive .  
85 See Case C-513/99, Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab v Helsinki 
Kaupunki and HKL-Bussiliikenne,  2002 I-07213. 
86 See Case C-532/06, Emm. G. Lianakis AE v Dimos 
Alexandroupolis and others, 2008 I-251. 
87 See Case C-513/99, Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab v Helsinki 
Kaupunki and HKL-Bussiliikenne, ECR 2002 I-07213, Bovis (2012: 417).  
88 Case C-19/00, SIAC Construction, ECR 2001 I-7725, par. 41. 
89 Case C-448/01, EVN AG and Wienstrom GmbH v Austria (“EVN”) ECR 2003 I-14527, Arrowsmith (2010b: 
170). 
90 Arrowsmith (2010b: 170).  
91 Case C-19/00, SIAC Construction,  ECR 2001 I-7725, par. 42. 
92 Case C-331/04, ATI EAC Srl e Viaggi di Maio Snc, ECR 2005 I-10109 
and others v ACTV Venezia Spa and others (“ATI EAC”). 
93 See Case C-513/99, Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab v Helsinki 
Kaupunki and HKL-Bussiliikenne, ECR 2002 I-7213. 
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“expressed by providing for a range with an appropriate maximum spread”94 or, where 
weighting is not possible “for demonstrable reasons”, through the indication of their 
importance, following a descending order so that tenderers can clearly ascertain the relative 
weight of the different factors for the evaluation process.  
 
Overall, the principal goal of the rules on the award criteria is to ensure that they are applied 
in a transparent way to avoid the concealment of discriminatory decisions.95 Some rules, 
however, also pursue other goals, such as the requirement that environmental criteria have to 
be specific and quantifiable. For the definition of award criteria of REDD+ credits this means 
that if co-benefits are to be rewarded the criteria for doing so must be defined with sufficient 
precision.  
 
V. Conclusions   
 
Despite numerous initiatives aimed to halt deforestation of rainforests, the rate of destruction 
continues to accelerate at an alarming rate.96 Many hope that the emerging REDD+ 
framework which encourages developing countries to reduce emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation will assist in reversing that trend, contributing to climate change 
mitigation while also improving the livelihoods of millions of people.  
 
So far, it remains unclear what the final legal architecture of REDD+ will look like. While 
substantial efforts have been made to sustain “readiness” activities that aim at strengthening 
governance and supporting capacity-building, the international community is split as to how 
support may best be linked to the achievement of measurable emission reductions. Many fear 
that market-based approaches would exacerbate environmental concerns and social inequities 
in rainforest states and fail to address the underlying causes of deforestation and forest 
degradation.  
 
This paper argues that while in the long term a combination of measures addressing the 
drivers of deforestation and encouraging investments in sustainable land use offers the best 
prospects for success, it is important that best practices for results-based payments, which 
provide an effective tool to incentivize recipients to achieve promised results, are identified. 
In the absence of an agreement at the international level on the design of market-based 
approaches, “bottom-up” initiatives should step in and take the lead.  
 
One possibility for fostering result-based support would be to organise a call for tenders for 
REDD+ credits. Such an approach would have several advantages. By putting a price on 
carbon, it leverages private investments and favours the early discovery of cost-efficient 
abatement options. It allows the testing of standards that have been developed in the voluntary 
market and may thus contribute to laying the groundwork for the adoption of international 
standards recognized by the UNFCCC. Finally, concurrently with the discovery of cost-
94 Art. 53 par. 2 of the Directive.  
95 Arrowsmith (2010b: 168). 
96 The IPCC estimated emissions from deforestation in the 1990s to be 5.8 GtCO2/yr. See 
http://unfccc.int/methods/redd/methodological_guidance/items/4123.php 
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efficient abatement, other goals, such as the protection of the livelihood of indigenous people 
and environmental co-benefits, can be pursued.  
 
It is important that the standards a tendering process promotes are robust and provide strong 
guarantees of environmental integrity of the credits it generates. It should, however, also 
allow a learning process that grants sufficient space for experimentation and the testing of 
different standards. Building on the experience gained, a progressive tightening of the 
standards may be envisaged over time.   
 
The successful outcome of a tendering procedure very much depends on the choice of the 
procedure and the definition of the tender. An adequate balance will have to be struck 
between a procedure that makes allowances for sufficient competition and a process that is 
flexible enough to accommodate different local and regional circumstances and provide tailor-
made solutions. Within the ambit of the EU both European and national public procurement 
laws will have to be given due consideration.    
  
An aspect that deserves special consideration is the transaction costs of a tendering procedure. 
The scrutiny of a great number of individual projects or programmes may indeed be very 
onerous for procuring entities with limited personnel resources. An interesting option to 
reduce transaction costs is represented by the “portfolio approach” developed by the Belgian 
authorities for their call for CDM and JI credits, which allows the procuring entity to delegate 
the examination of single projects to professionals, while remaining responsible for the 
definition of the tender and the global oversight of the procedure. 
 
Overall, a call for tender for REDD+ credits represents a novel approach that breaks new 
ground. It does not substitute efforts for REDD+ readiness, but complements them by putting 
a price on carbon, which is desperately needed to provide the right incentives in the forestry 
sector. The funding sources may come either from public budgets or from special funds set up 
for that purpose.97 Dependent on public money, it does not, of course, solve the problem of 
strained budgets, but helps to spend funds in a cost-efficient manner. Twisting somewhat Neil 
Armstrong’s famous quote,98 we might like to conclude that reversing and halting 
deforestation would be “a giant leap for mankind”, but will, eventually, only be achieved by 
thousands of small steps of men and women. “Protecting tropical forests through public 
procurement of emission reductions” represents one of them.  
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